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Accountability and Political Tolerance: "Sober Second-Thought" or Knee-Jerk?

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ACCOUNTABILITY AND POLITICAL TOLERANCE:

"SOBER SECOND-THOUGHT" OR KNEE-JERK?

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INTRODUCTION

Background

"I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." This absolute-free-speech sentiment, first reportedly expressed by Voltaire (1770), has long been held as a democratic ideal of paramount importance (Jefferson, 1944; Prothro & Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964; Mill, 1869). In reality, most Americans are not willing to fight and die for unpopular speech; indeed they will not even tacitly allow controversial public displays and protests (Stouffer, 1955). This disparity between ideal and fact was first observed in a landmark political tolerance study by political scientist Samuel Stouffer, and has vexed political theorists and scientists ever since.

In survey and experimental studies, political tolerance is typically defined as "an individual's willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes" (Crick, 1973; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982). Across decades of inquiry and using a variety of dependent measures, political scientists and psychologists have replicated Stouffer's basic finding: the American public is massively intolerant (McClosky & Brill, 1983;Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Sullivan et al, 1982; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). The psychological underpinnings of tolerance (or rather, mass intolerance) thus deserve scientific inquiry.

Psychological Contributors to Tolerance

Survey and experimental research has outlined a bevy of psychological factors that influence how readily a person tolerates groups they find abhorrent. Among personality factors, low self-esteem, high neuroticism and low openness to experience have all been linked to low political tolerance (Marcus et al, 1995, Sullivan et al, 1982). Other individual differences such as authoritarianism have also been linked to tolerance, with more authoritarian and right-wing authoritarian participants displaying far less tolerance than average (Gibson, 1987). A variety of situational threat manipulations have also demonstrably lowered individuals' political tolerance (Chanley, 1994; Theiss-Morse, 1993).

Elite Tolerance

Social and political differences also appear to influence political tolerance. However, some of the more obvious possible determinants of tolerance do not, in fact, appear to be directly implicated: while social conservatism appears to have a bearing on tolerance, political ideology and party do not have direct effects (Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman & Piereson, 1981; see Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1993 for a review). One of the most robust findings in the political tolerance literature is that political elites and activists are more tolerant than members of the mass public (McClosky, 1964; McClosky & Brill, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 1978; Stouffer, 1955). Samuel Stouffer hypothesized that people who were involved in politics were better informed about society's core democratic values than average, and were more motivated to uphold

them. As a result, such elites were capable of pausing and taking a "sober second thought" when faced with an objectionable group; he argued that this thoughtful pause afforded elites greater tolerance (Stouffer, 1955). With this argument Stouffer essentially suggested that tolerance judgments were psychologically similar to other forms of bias correction (Devine, 1989; Wegener & Petty, 2001; Lepore & Brown, 2002).

One possible reason that elites and activists are more tolerant is that they tend to be better-educated (Sullivan et al, 1982). Controlling for political involvement, more years of education typically spell greater tolerance (Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Sinderman, 1984). Noting this pattern in his data, Stouffer hypothesized the mediating role of diversity of experience: the educated have more exposure to a variety of individuals, he argued, and through this exposure learn how to peacefully coexist with different others. This explanation for elite tolerance has generally not held over time, however (Sullivan et al, 1982; Bobo & Licari, 1989). The nature of the link between political involvement, education, and political tolerance thus remains unclear.

The Role of Cognitive Complexity

Bobo and Licari (1989) suggested that both political elites and the highly educated are more tolerant because they are more cognitively complex. The authors' logic is similar to that expressed in Stouffer's notion of a "sober second thought"; the educated and politically informed possess the capacity to think rationally and carefully when forming political tolerance judgments, while others do not. Bobo and Licari found a link between cognitive complexity and tolerance, and concluded that elites and the highly

educated are more tolerant by virtue of a "sober second thought". However, their study was mired with methodological problems. The authors' only measure of "cognitive complexity" was a vocabulary test, and participants' level of education was left unmeasured. In using this methodology the authors neglected the possibility that vocabulary-test score simply was associated with some other variable left unmeasured (such as education). Bobo and Licari have therefore provided limited evidence for the "sober second thought" of tolerance, at best. There is little substantial evidence that increases in cognitive ability or complexity engendered by education or elite status cause a concomitant increase in tolerance.

Indeed, other studies fly in the face of the "elites take a sober second thought" hypothesis regarding political tolerance. One major problem with in this mediational argument is that elites and activists are not necessarily more cognitively complex. Political ideologues have been observed to score low on several measures of cognitive depth-of-processing, such as integrative complexity (Tetlock, 1983, 1984). Using a variety of measures, Van Hiel & Mervielde (2003) found that ideological extremists (who are more likely to be activists, and are more likely to be politically involved) demonstrated lower cognitive complexity on most tests. This body of research suggests that elites and activists may not arrive at more tolerant decisions as a result of the depth- or breadth-of-cognitive-processing.

Tolerance as "Knee-jerk"?

The results of several additional studies suggest that political tolerance may not

arise from the "sober second thoughts" of pensive, cognitively deep elites. As described above, elites may not be more cognitively "deep" or more especially capable of "second thinking" in the first place. Additionally, political tolerance itself may not be a judgment that is reached with slow deliberation. Kuklinksi and colleagues (1991, 1993) manipulated participants' processing goal before providing them with a political tolerance questionnaire. Participants were told to either complete the tolerance questionnaire while thinking deliberately and slowly about possible consequences of their decisions, or they were instructed to fill out the questionnaire intuitively- according to their "gut feelings".

The "sober second thought" school of political tolerance would predict that participants in the "consequences" condition would report greater tolerance than those who ran through the questionnaire quickly. Kuklinski et al found the opposite result: participants who had to think about the consequences of tolerance reported less tolerance for controversial groups than participants who used their gut-level reactions. If tolerance involves a process similar to prejudice correction, then perhaps tolerance *itself* is the snap-judgment that is "corrected" given time. Tolerance may not be a second thought, but rather a knee-jerk response evident only in the elite and educated.

Further in support for the tolerance-as-knee-jerk research hypothesis is the observation that internalization of democratic norms predicts tolerance (Gibson & Bingham, 1983; Gibson, 1987; Lawrence, 1976; McClosky & Brill, 1983). This suggests that those who are committed to democratic ideals may voice attitudes of tolerance without much thought, because valued concepts such as free speech are central to their

understanding of American government. When democratic values are deeply internalized (as in political elites), tolerance may be expressed as an automatic attitude, one that is readily accessible at the mere mention of attitude-relevant issues such as civil liberties (Fazio, 2001).

Considering the possibility that tolerant judgments may be reached 'automatically' without extensive cognitive processing, it pays also to consider the role of attitude importance and attitude accessibility (e.g., Krosnick, 1989; Fazio, 2001).. Attitudes of high personal relevance or importance are typically easier to access, and are more likely to be automatically activated even in the absence of effortful processing. Elites and activists generally have high commitment to democratic norms, and may therefore appear more tolerant than non-elites because their attitudes toward civil liberties are more accessible than their attitudes toward disliked groups, or their attitudes toward the possible negative outcomes of tolerance (Marcus et al, 1995; Sullivan et al, 1982). A strong, important pro-free-speech attitude may result in a cognitive "knee-jerk" expression of high political tolerance.

Testing the "Sober Second Thought" and "Knee-jerk" Views of Tolerance

The present study attempts to glean whether political tolerance is generally attained through a slow, cognitively deep "sober second thought" or whether it is driven by a relatively thoughtless "knee-jerk" automatic attitude. Previous studies have examined the cognitive determinants and nature of tolerance by measuring variables such as cognitive complexity. Because cognitive complexity has typically been measured

rather than manipulated**,** it has been conflated with a variety of other variables in these past studies (e.g., education).

Rather than measuring cognitive complexity using survey methodology, the present study experimentally manipulated how effortfully and deeply participants considered questions of political tolerance. Participants in one condition were instructed from the experiment's outset in a manner intended to make them feel "accountable" for their tolerance judgments. This should boost their depth-of-cognitive processing, or at least motivate them to engage in bias-correction (a detailed discussion of this manipulation and its possible effects is found in the "methods" section below). The second group of participants were assigned to either a 'distraction' condition, and asked to complete a side task designed to prevent deep, thoughtful processing**.** The third group of participants was assigned to a control condition where no additional tasks or instructions were added. This manipulation is similar to the tolerance experiments by Kuklinski et al, insofar as participants are randomly assigned to one of three possible instruction manipulation conditions, one of which suggests conscious deliberation, one of which discourages such thoughtful processing, and one control. The presently employed manipulation is distinct, however, in that the 'high accountability' condition, in contrast to Kuklinski and colleague's "think about the consequences" condition, encourages participants to think more without instructing them in what they should think *about*.

Participants in Kuklinski et al's 'consequences' condition may have only devoted more thought to the negative ramifications of tolerance, because 'consequences' may have

a more negative connotation (a possible confound Kuklinski and colleagues themselves foresaw). This focus on the potential drawbacks of tolerance, such as threats to public safety, the potential for ensuing chaos, etc, may explain why participants were generally less tolerant when asked to think 'more'. Rather than giving participants in the 'accountability' condition specific issues to consider as they ponder political tolerance, participants in the present study were only instructed that they would be held responsible for their tolerance judgments, which leaves the issues and values they may in turn consider in forming their tolerance judgments entirely open-ended.

The manipulation of participants' accountability alter**s** their motivation to process tolerance questions deeply. By manipulating accountability and by preventing deep-thinking through the use of a distraction condition**;** it can be determined how cognitive effort actually impacts tolerance and do so while controlling for related constructs such as education. By using a subject pool that is relatively homogenous in age and educational background, years of education can be held nearly constant and therefore limit its potential as a confounding variable.

This study also has the advantage of potentially pitting the tolerance-as-sober-second-thought hypothesis against the tolerance-as-knee-jerk hypothesis. If tolerant people arrive at their judgments through slow, deliberate cognitive effort, then participants in conditions amenable to effortful processing should express more tolerance. If tolerance is instead a thoughtless, automatic knee-jerk attitude, participants in the distraction condition should appear more tolerant than those given time and sufficient

motivation to deliberate. Several possible moderators of these two effects will also be explored.

Potential moderators

The effect of instruction manipulations on political tolerance **may** depend on several individual differences among participants. These include constructs related to political awareness such as ideological extremity, party identification, political expertise, political interest and political involvement.**.** Since political tolerance is quite rare in the mass public, tolerance might only be an automatic knee-jerk among those who are informed, involved in politics, or who have internalized democratic norms (i.e., for those whom pro-free-speech attitudes are highly important and accessible). The extent and breadth of mass intolerance precludes the possibility that tolerance is an immediate, no-brainer decision for the majority of voters. However, for participants who are closer to being political "elites" (e.g. those high on political involvement, expertise, political interest, etc) internalization of democratic norms and a strong commitment to the American political system and its values may promote an automatic attitude of tolerance. Conversely, these high-awareness, high-involvement participants may display less tolerance than usual when the experiment instructions place them in a position of accountability. While these participants would normally be more inclined to automatically express tolerance, accountability instructions might motivate the individuals to consider additional, conflicting considerations. For example, just as participants in Kuklinski et al's (1991) study became less tolerant in the “think about the

consequences" condition, the elite participants in the present study may be more prone to anticipate the (negative) consequences of tolerance when placed in the high accountability condition.

Alternatively, elite participants may correct their automatic, tolerant attitude when they are held accountable not because of consideration of consequences, but as a form of bias correction (Wegner & Petty, 1995). If participants in the 'accountability' condition are simply motivated to 'correct' and give defensible answers, then elites may express (typically) high or greater-than-usual tolerance. Elites are more likely not only to have internalized democratic norms; they are also more likely to know that widespread civil liberties are the politically 'correct' response in the first place. Therefore the accountability manipulation may have entirely disparate effects on elite tolerance, depending on whether accountability inspires thoughtful consideration of consequences or attitude correction.

A different pattern may arise amongst participants low in political interest, involvement, and other related constructs. Participants who score low on such variables- often labeled political 'novices'- should not be especially tolerant by default, and should report rather low tolerance scores in the control and "distraction" conditions. In the "accountable" condition, however, novice participants may take the time to correct for their prejudices and may express slightly more tolerance than usual. As with political elites, non-elite participants may shift their views either by an effortful consideration of the values involved in their decision, or may just engage more swiftly in bias-correction

based on naïve theories of their own prejudice. Again the exact pattern of effects of the 'accountability' manipulation among novices may depend on whether participants correct for bias or think more deeply in general. If novices use the accountability manipulation as a cue to think more deliberately about the political issues implicated in political tolerance, they may become more tolerant overall. If being held accountable only alters novice's motivation to correct for bias, they may 'correct' for what prejudice they possess toward abhorrent groups, and consequently voice greater tolerance. Alternatively, non-elite participants may take the "accountability" manipulation as a cue to think about the negative consequences of free speech, and may subsequently respond with typically low or lower-than-average tolerance.

Political ideology and party identification might also influence political tolerance; Namely, conservative and Republican participants might likely report less tolerance. Diminished tolerance among the political right has frequently been observed in past studies (Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al, 1981) and I expect it to be replicated here. The reasons for this demonstrable trend are uncertain, as the relation between political ideology or party identification and cognitive style and motivation to correct bias is inconsistent in past research (Tetlock, 1983; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson & Chamberlin, 2002). Conservative and Republican participants may be less tolerant due to placing greater value on public safety and the maintenance of law and order rather than on civil liberties, or they may report less tolerance because they are high on average on personality traits related to low tolerance, such as authoritarianism. Conservative

participants may be less tolerant due to a smaller breadth of experience, and subsequent unfamiliarity with strange and frightening political groups, as proposed by Stouffer.

Potential Controls

Considering that differing levels of tolerance may be driven in part by differences in motivation or ability to process tolerance questions effortfully, the impact of several individual difference variables in cognitive motivation and style-of-processing must also be considered and controlled for. Participants' need for cognition will be measured (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) and need to evaluate (Jarvis & Petty, 1996). If a tendency to process slowly and thoughtfully leads to tolerance- ala a "sober second thought", then participants high in need for cognition may be more disposed to tolerance, regardless of experimental condition. If tolerance is instead an automatic attitude, then the opposite effect might be observed.

Hypotheses

There are seven hypotheses pertaining to this study, listed below.

H1a: Previous research suggests elites are more tolerant than novices. Hypothesis 1a presumes that this difference arises even for automatic, "knee jerk" tolerance judgments. Thus, in the distraction condition, Hypothesis 1a predicts experts will express more tolerance than novices.

H1b: Hypothesis 1b presumes the difference between experts and novices primarily occurs as a result of non-automatic, cognitive deliberation. According to this view, in the distraction condition, expert and novice will express similar levels of

tolerance.

H2: In the accountability condition, participants may report higher tolerance overall than in the distraction condition. Non-distracted participants who are not distracted and are held accountable for their judgments may engage in corrective elaboration, and adjust from their initially prejudiced attitude to a more tolerant one.

H3: In the accountability condition, participants may instead be more motivated to consider the consequences of tolerance (as opposed to engaging in correction for prejudice, as expressed in hypothesis 2). If this is the case, participants may report less tolerance in the accountability condition than in the distraction condition, across both elites and novices.

H4: In contrast with Hypotheses 2 and 3, accountability may encourage different kinds of elaboration among elites than novices. Insofar as previous research suggests elites are more tolerant than novices, accountability may encourage elite participants to consider democratic norms and the value of civil liberties, or to consider the import of correcting for anti-group biases, while novice participants may consider the potential dangers of free speech, or their innate prejudice for their least-liked group. In other words, participants may engage in "flexible deliberation". If this hypothesis holds, elites should become more tolerant in the accountability condition versus the distraction condition, while novices will become more intolerant. This hypothesis argues that accountability engenders cognitive elaboration that reinforces an individual's initial "leaning" with regard to tolerance judgments. As such, accountability magnifies the

difference between elite and novice participants (who presumably possess distinct initial 'leanings').

H5: Accountability may instead encourage the opposite type of "flexible deliberation"- elites and novices may both be motivated to consider factors that do not normally influence their decisions, specifically because they will have to justify their judgment to another person. Therefore, elite participants may focus on the possible negative consequences of tolerance, and may become less tolerant overall. Conversely, novices may be motivated to correct for their prejudices or consider the value of civil liberties, and report greater tolerance than in the distraction condition.

H6: Given no special instructions, participants in the control condition may possess insufficient motivation to correct for bias, and thus may display the same degree of intolerance as the participants in the distraction condition.

H7: In contrast to Hypothesis 6, participants in the control condition may instead behave more like participants in the accountability condition; In other words, participants in the distraction condition may be under too heavy a cognitive load to report anything beyond an automatic attitude, whereas participants in the accountability and control conditions may possess sufficient cognitive resources to deliberate in one of the four ways proposed above (in Hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5).

CHAPTER TWO

METHODS AND MATERIALS

Participants and Sampling

For the present study I utilized a convenience sample of undergraduate psychology students. Students enrolled in an introductory psychology course could volunteer to participate in the study in return for one credit toward their course's research participation requirement. This sampling method had the advantage of affording a large potential sample size at relatively no cost. The subject pool is typically homogenous in terms of age and years of education, which is advantageous for the purposes of this study as education is thereby held nearly constant. Education can thus not be conflated with cognitive ability or political elite status, as it has been in past studies of political tolerance (e.g., Bobo & Licari, 1989).

A total of 165 Loyola Undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology course were recruited to participate in the experiment. The sample consisted of 46 men and 119 women. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 25 years old (M=18.64).

Procedure

Upon enrolling, participants were brought into a laboratory room by an experimenter, in groups of one to six. Participants were informed that they would be answering questions about “young adults’ political opinions”. The experimenter then asked participants to take a seat at a computer where the survey would be administered.

The survey instructions would differ depending on the condition to which the participant was randomly assigned (accountability, distraction, or control: see below). Upon reading the condition-specific instructions, all participants were asked to report their "least-liked" political group. Participants were then asked to respond to a twenty-item tolerance survey (see below). After responding to the tolerance questionnaire, participants were asked to report their responses to various political, cognitive, and demographic items (see below).

Materials

Predictor Variables: Political Measures

Participants were asked to report their political ideology on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely conservative) to 7 (extremely liberal) with a midpoint of "moderate". Participants were asked to report their party identification on an ordinal scale with the following options: Strong Democrat, Moderate Democrat, Independent, Moderate Republican, Strong Democrat.

Participants' political expertise was assessed using a fifteen-item questionnaire asking participants open-ended knowledge questions regarding American politics and government (e.g., "How many seats are there the Senate?") as well as asking them to identify current political figures (e.g., "Hilary Clinton) in a multiple choice format (Delli Carpini, & Keeter, 1993). Participants' responses were scored as dichotomous right/wrong answers, and then averaged to compute a total knowledge score.

Participants were asked to report their level of political interest by responding to three seven-point scale items (e.g., "Generally speaking, I am interested in politics.") ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly). To measure political

involvement, participants were asked to respond to five seven-point scale items assessing their degree of behavioral involvement in politics (e.g., “I intend to vote in the next election.”; “I like to participate in political campaigns.”). Participants were asked to report the extent to which they pay attention to politics using a one-item, seven-point scale measure (“Generally speaking, I pay attention to politics”) ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly).

Predictor Variables: Cognitive Measures

Participants’ need for cognition was assessed using a 16-item questionnaire of five-point scale items (e.g., “I prefer complex to simple problems”), with possible responses ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly) (Cacioppo et al, 1996). Participants’ need for evaluation was assessed using a 16-item questionnaire of five-point scale items (e.g., “I form opinions about everything”) ranging from 1 (extremely uncharacteristic of me) to 5 (extremely characteristic of me) (Jarvis & Petty, 1996).

Predictor Variables: Manipulated Independent Variable

Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: an accountability condition, a distraction condition and a control (no special instructions, no additional task) condition. Participants in the accountability manipulation condition were informed by the experiment materials that they would have to justify their survey answers to another person with unknown views. Past research has demonstrated that making a participant feel accountable for their responses in this way boosts integrative complexity, or the extent and depth of processing (Tetlock, 1983).

Participants in the high cognitive load condition were informed by the experimental materials that they would be asked to memorize a seven-digit string of numbers that would be provided before beginning their questionnaire, and which they would be asked to report back after completing the political tolerance portion. Participants were then provided with the seven-digit number and then administered the tolerance questionnaire. Participants in this condition received an additional manipulation check from the ones utilized for all participants: upon completing the tolerance questionnaire, participants in the "distraction" condition were asked to report the number they told to remember. This number was then coded as incorrect or correct (incorrect= 0, correct=1) by the researcher. This manipulation has been used to place participants under high cognitive load in past decision-making research (e.g., Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999).

Participants in the control condition received no special instructions or additional tasks to perform before completing the political tolerance questionnaire.

Dependent Variable: Political Tolerance

Participants' political tolerance was assessed using the content-controlled procedure first outlined by Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus (1982). Participants were first asked to name their least-liked political group. Participants were given several options of contemporary fringe political groups, including the Klu Klux Klan, Tea Party Protesters, Pro-Choice activists, Pro-Life activists, and Atheists. Participants also had the option to name their own least-liked group ("Other: _____").

Participants were then asked to respond to a variety of questions inquiring about their least-liked group's right to civil liberties. Participants saw the least-liked

group they selected (or named) in the political tolerance response items, though the content of the questions was otherwise held constant. Participants were asked to evaluate their least-liked group's right to protest, hold rallies, and run for political office, among other related First Amendment rights. As originally used by Sullivan et al (1982), participants were asked to report their tolerance on a seven-point scale (1= disagree strongly; 7=agree strongly) in response to each question (e.g., “Members of the _____ should be banned from being President of the U.S.”).

Manipulation Checks: Self-Report of Cognitive Effort

I attempted to ensure the accountability manipulation was successful in motivating participants to process more deliberately by asking them to report how much time and effort they placed into answering the political tolerance questions. Participants were asked to respond to five seven-point scale items inquiring into how thoughtfully and deliberately they believe**d** they answered the tolerance items (e.g., "I imagined possible consequences of my answer when I filled out the questionnaire."; "I answered each question fairly slowly and thoughtfully"). If the accountability and distraction manipulations were successful, participants in the accountability condition should report exerting greater cognitive effort than participants in the distraction and control conditions.

CHAPTER THREE

RESULTS

Statistical Treatment Overview

Except when otherwise noted, multiple regression was used to analyze the data for the present study. Continuous moderating variables (e.g., political knowledge, ideology, political involvement, etc) were centered (by subtracting participant's scores on each scale from the sample mean) and categorical variables (e.g. condition, party affiliation, demographics) were dummy coded. All two-way interaction terms (between, e.g., political expertise and condition) were created by multiplying the appropriate variables together. These terms were entered into a regression equation. By using this statistical approach, omnibus main effects can be tested at Step 1 and two-way interactions can be tested at Step 2, and so on for three-way or four-way interactions (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).

When significant interactions were found between condition and the predicted political moderators, simple effects were explored via regression with dummy coding using the techniques outlined by Aiken and West (1991). For example, political interest can be recoded such that the effect of condition can be seen when political interest is low (one standard deviation below mean) versus high (one standard deviation above mean) (e.g., the effect of condition on tolerance when low interest = 0, high interest= 1, or low interest= -1, high interest= 0).

Preliminary Analyses

Reliability Analyses

Composite scores were created for all multi-item measures, including political tolerance, political expertise, effort expended, need for cognition, and political interest. Reliability analyses were performed to determine how best to create these composite scores. All twenty tolerance items were highly internally reliable upon initial analysis (α=.927), and so all twenty items were included in participants' composite political tolerance score. Need for cognition was also internally reliable (α=.894) and all items were retained for participants' composite score.

When composite scales were not sufficiently internally reliable at first analysis, items were selectively removed until the highest possible reliability score could be attained for that scale. For example, the initial five-item measure of participants' self-reported effort was not sufficiently reliable (α=.503), but reliability analyses suggested that Chronbach's alpha for the scale would increase if effort item 1 was removed. Effort item 1 was removed and analyses were performed again; reliability analysis again suggested that Chronbach's alpha could be boosted through the removal of effort item 5. Item 5 was then removed from the effort scale, and reliability analyses were performed again- this procedure was repeated until Chronbach's alpha for the scale was as high as possible. Through this method, final composite scales of effort, expertise, and interest were created.

The final, most reliable possible effort scale consists of effort items 3 and 4 (α=.690). The final measure of expertise contains all fifteen items except for an open-

ended item asking which political party controlled the House of Representatives (the 2010 midterm national elections were held during the time of data collection, and participants may have been confused about whether to report the pre- or post-election results (α=.504). The final measure of political interest contained items two of the original five-item measure (α=.840).

Manipulation Check

To confirm that the accountability manipulation did indeed influence participants' processing of the tolerance questionnaire, I performed a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) of condition predicting effort, and an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) of condition predicting effort with expertise, attention to politics, interest in politics, need for cognition and gender entered as covariates (see below for description of the use of these as control variables). ANOVA and ANCOVA results demonstrated no significant difference in participants' self-report level of effort between conditions, (*SS*= 4.329 $F(2,162)= 1.341$, $p= .264$, $\eta^2= .016$ without controls; with controls, $F(2,162)= .072$, $p= .780$, $\eta^2=.019$ see Tables 1 and 2 in appendix). This suggests that participants in the accountability, control, and distraction conditions did not differ significantly in the amount of effort they reported expending on the tolerance questions.

However, since the accountability manipulation was intended to influence participants' efforts in processing the political tolerance questions while the distraction manipulation was intended only to influence ability to process, it was necessary to also examine all pairwise tests of the effect of condition rather than the omnibus test alone. All possible pairwise contrasts were conducted in ANOVA and ANCOVA as well, to

ensure that there were no significant differences between any two conditions on level of political tolerance, in addition to tests of omnibus differences. Contrasts indicate that participants in the accountability condition (*M*= .150 without controls; *M*= .141 with controls) did not differ significantly in political tolerance than participants in the control condition (*M*= .049 without controls; *M*= .088 with controls) or participants in the distraction conditions (*M*= -.241 without controls; *M*= -.240 with controls, all $p>.05$, see Table 3 and 4 in appendix). Contrasts also indicated that participants in the accountability condition did not differ significantly from participants in the control and distraction conditions when the latter two groups were pooled ($F(1,162)= 1.149$, $\eta^2=.007$, $p=.285$ without controls; $F(1,162)= 1.338$, $\eta^2=.008$, $p=.249$ with controls, see Table 5 in appendix).

These results may indicate that the accountability and distraction manipulations were weak or unsuccessful. Or these results may indicate the effort measure was insensitive to actual variations in participants' processing of the questions (e.g., a ceiling effect may have occurred, where all participants were motivated to report high effort for reasons of social desirability). The results of the manipulation check do, however, reveal non-significant differences in the expected direction. Namely, participants in the accountability condition have a higher mean effort score than participants in the control condition, who had higher mean effort score than participants in the distraction condition.

Bivariate Relations Between Variables

Preliminary analyses were performed to examine the relation between condition and the continuous predictor variables- need for cognition, political interest, political

expertise, and attention paid to politics, as well as gender. Five one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) were performed to determine whether or not participants in the three manipulation conditions differed significantly in their scores on these variables. ANOVA results indicated that there were no significant differences between participants in the accountability, distraction, and control conditions on these five variables (all p>.05, see Tables 6 and 7). Thus, random assignment to the three conditions successfully avoided confounds with the measured predictor variables.

Additional preliminary analyses examined the relation between the continuous predictor variables (see Table 8 in appendix). Political expertise was significantly negatively correlated with gender (r= -.246, r^2= .06, p=.002, M_{male}=.0755 SD= .220, M_{female}=.029, SD= .172), positively correlated with political interest (r=.441, r^2=.19, p<.001), and negatively correlated with attention paid to politics (r= -.410, r^2=.17, p<.001). Need for cognition was significantly positively correlated with gender (r= .162, r^2=.03, p=.038, M_{male}=.095, SD=.385, M_{female}=.037, SD=.357), and attention paid to politics (r=.411, r^2=.17, p<.001), and negatively correlated with effort (r= -.374, r^2=.14, p<.001), and interest in politics (r= -.462, r^2=.213, p<.001). Political interest was significantly negatively correlated with gender (r= -.252, r^2=.06, p=.001, M_{male}=.2795, SD= .775 for men, M_{female}=.108, SD=.628) and attention paid to politics (r= -.805, r^2=.65, p<.001), and positively correlated with effort (r=.171, r^2=.03, p=.028),. Attention paid to politics was also significantly positively correlated with gender (r=.243, r^2=.06, p=.002, M_{male}=.146, SD=.393, M_{female}=.029, SD=.172).

The bivariate relations between predictor variables and political tolerance were also examined (see Table 8). Political tolerance was significantly positively correlated with political expertise (r= .212, r^2=.04, p=.006). Tolerance was negatively correlated with gender (r= -.166, r^2=.02, p=.033, M=3.809, SD=1.364 for men, M=3.356, SD=1.148 for women), need for cognition (r= -.340, r^2= .11, p<.001), and attention paid to politics (r= -.344, r^2= .12, p<.001), and positively correlated with political interest (r= .367, r^2= .13, p<.001),. Note that political ideology and political party, despite being variables of massive import in political psychology, were only correlated with one another (r=.780, r^2=. 608 p<.001) and were not significantly related to any other measured predictors. This is consistent with past research demonstrating no direct link between political ideology and political tolerance (Sullivan et al, 1981).

Because political expertise, attention to politics, gender, interest in politics, and need for cognition were significantly correlated with the dependent variable, analyses examining the main effect of condition on political tolerance were run twice: once with these variables entered as controls (in regression) or covariates (in ANCOVA), and once without these variables included. Inclusion of these control (covariate) variables in analyses presumably reduces error variance in the dependent variable.

Main Analyses

Three sets of analyses were performed. First, a model focusing on the direct effect of Condition on political tolerance judgments was tested. Second, models examining two-way interactions between a given moderator and condition were tested. Lastly, models involving three-**way** interactions (two moderators and condition) were tested.

Condition Predicting Tolerance

A one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to test the effect of condition on tolerance. The predicted omnibus effect of condition on participants' political tolerance was not significant ($F(2,162)= .742$, $p=.478$, $\eta^2= .009_p$, see Table 9). This analysis was also performed with political interest, expertise, attention to politics, gender, and need for cognition entered as covariates (ANCOVA): Again, no significant main effect of condition on tolerance was apparent ($F(2,162)= 1.092$, $p=.338$, $\eta^2= .014_p$, see Table 10). These results suggest that participants in the accountability, distraction, and control conditions did not differ significantly on political tolerance.

In addition to the omnibus ANOVA and ANCOVA, pairwise contrasts were also performed to determine whether participants in the accountability, distraction, or control conditions differed from one another on levels of political tolerance. Analyses revealed that participants in the control condition ($M= 3.645$ without controls, $M= 3.627$ with controls) did not differ significantly from participants in the accountability ($M= 3.420$ without controls, $M= 3.470$ with controls) or distraction conditions ($M= 3.378$ without controls, $M= 3.301$ with controls), nor did participants in the accountability condition differ from participants in the distraction condition (all $p>.15$, see Tables 11, 12 and 13 in appendix).

Two-Way Interaction Models (Moderator by Condition)

Additional analyses tested for possible interactions between condition and the continuous moderator variables (effort, interest, attention, and need for cognition). To test possible interactions between condition and these variables, I employed linear regression

with interaction terms. Control variables (effort, interest, attention, need for cognition, and gender) were entered into the regression equation along with condition and the potential moderator variable at step 1. The condition by moderator variable (effort, interest, attention, or need for cognition) interaction terms were entered as additional predictors at step 2. Main effects of condition and the moderator were tested at step 1, while interactions between conditions and continuous predictors were tested at step 2.

Linear transformations were performed on the control and independent variables before running the analyses. Control variables were normalized. All continuous moderator variables were re-scaled from -.5 (low on expertise, attention, need for cognition, or interest, respectively) to .5 (high on these continuous variables, respectively). Two two-way interactions were found to be significant at the $p<.05$ level: condition by need for cognition, and condition by gender.

Condition by Need for Cognition Interaction

The two condition dummy codes (accountability versus control and distraction versus control) were entered along with need for cognition and the control variables at step 1. Linear regression results at step 1 revealed no significant effect of condition on tolerance for the accountability versus control dummy code (*B*= -.156, β= .062 *SE*= .213 with controls, *B*= -.271, β= -.107, *SE*= .215 without controls, both p>.10), nor for the distraction versus control dummy code (*B*= -.331, β= -.124, *SE*= .224 with controls, *B*= -.344, β= -.129, *SE*= .227, both *p*>.10, see Tables 14 and 15). This lack of an effect of condition is consistent with the ANOVA results reported above. Step 1 did reveal a significant main effect of need for cognition predicting tolerance, (*B*= -.745, β= -.225,

SE= .272, without controls, *B*= - 1.156, β= -.348, *SE*= .245 with controls, both *p*<.05), suggesting that participants higher in need for cognition reported lower tolerance.

Regression analyses did reveal a marginally significant interaction between the accountability condition dummy code and need for cognition predicting political tolerance at step 2 with controls (*B*= .972, β= .147, *SE*= .582, *t*(154)= 1.670, *p*= .097, see Table 14), though this interaction was not significant in an otherwise-identical regression performed without controls (*B*= .754, β= .114, *SE*= .585 *p*>.10). The significant interaction term suggests that the effect of the accountability condition (versus control) on participants' political tolerance may be moderated by participants' need for cognition.

Simple slopes analyses revealed a marginally significant difference between participants high in need for cognition in the accountability condition (*M*= 3.013 *SE*= .202) who were marginally less tolerant than high need for cognition participants in the control condition (*M*= 3.172 *SE*= .212; *B*= .972, β= .243, *SE*= .582, *p*<.05, see Tables 16 and 17). Participants high in need for cognition in the control condition *(M*= 3.172 *SE*= .212) did not differ from high need for cognition participants in the distraction condition (*M*= 3.231 *SE*= .191,; *B*= -.454, β= -.110, *SE*= .596, *p*= .447**)**. Participants high in need for cognition in the accountability condition (*M*= 3.013 *SE*= .202) did not significantly differ from participants high in need for cognition in the distraction condition (*M*= 3.231 *SE*= .191; *B*= -.518, β= -.126, *SE*= .597, *p*= .387). Conversely, participants low in need for cognition were more tolerant in the accountability condition (*M*= 4.004 *SE*= .204) than in the control condition (*M*= 3.678 *SE*= .192; *B*= .972, β= .242, *SE*= .582, *p*<.10) . However, participants low in need for cognition in the accountability condition (*M*=

4.004 *SE*= .204) did not differ significantly in tolerance from participants in the distraction condition (*M*= 3.964 *SE*= .193; *B*= -.518, β= -.123, *SE*= .597, *p*= .387). There was no significant difference between participants low in need for cognition in the control (*M*= 3.678 *SE*= .192) and distraction conditions (*M*= 3.964 *SE*= .193;*B*= -.454, β= .129, *SE*= .596, *p*= .447).

These results are somewhat consistent with hypothesis 5, which anticipated that individuals who are more apt to think effortfully about politics would engage in "flexible deliberation" of the sort that would decrease tolerance in the accountability condition (either due to consideration of factors they don't normally weigh, or due to a desire to give a response that would be similar to their conversation partners'). Hypothesis 5 also predicted that those less apt to think effortfully about politics would show "flexible deliberation" of the sort that would *increase* tolerance in the accountability condition (either due to consideration of pro-tolerance factors such participants don't normally take into account, or due to a desire to give a socially desirable response).

Although this analysis garnered some support for Hypothesis 5, related analyses failed to reveal that political expertise, interest, attention to politics, or any other predictor related to "elite political status" was a significant moderator of the effect of condition on tolerance. Instead, the effect of condition on tolerance was moderated by need for cognition, a more general cognitive individual-difference variable.

Condition by Gender Interaction

Regression analyses also revealed a significant interaction of the distraction condition dummy code with gender, which was apparent in analyses both with and

without controls (*B*= -1.080, β= -.220, *SE*= .505, *t*(154)= -2.137 with controls, *B*= -1.186, β= -.214 *SE*= .538, both *p*<.05, see Tables 18 and 19). This suggests that the effect of the distraction condition (versus control) on participants' political tolerance was moderated by participants' gender.

Simple slopes analyses revealed that female participants are significantly more tolerant in the distraction condition (*M*= 3.571 *SE*= .128) than in the control condition (*M*= 3.267 *SE*= .128; *B*= -1.190, β= -.248, *SE*= .512, *p*<.05). However, female participants in the accountability condition (*M*= 3.425 *SE*= .132) did not differ from female participants in the control condition (*M*= 3.267 *SE*= .128, *B*= -.696, β= -.150, *SE*= .461, *p*>.05, see Table 20 and 21). Further, female participants in the distraction condition (*M*= 3.571 *SE*= .128) did not differ significantly from female participants in the accountability condition on tolerance (*M*= 3.425 *SE*= .132; *B*= .493, β= .106, *SE*= .507, *p*= .332). Conversely, male participants were *less* tolerant in the distraction condition (*M*= 3.525 *SE*= .197) than in the control condition (*M*= 3.816 *SE*= .224, *B*= -1.190, β= -.393, *SE*= .512, *p*<.05. Male participants in the accountability condition (*M*= 3.626 *SE*= .223) were significantly less tolerant than male participants in the control condition (*M*= 3.816 *SE*= .224, *B*= -.696, β= -.237, *SE*= .461, *p*<.05). Male participants in the distraction condition (*M*= 3.525 *SE*= .197) did not significantly differ from male participants in the accountability condition on political tolerance (*M*= 3.626 *SE*= .223; *B*= -.493, β= -.163, *SE*= .507, p>.05).

Three-Way Interaction Models (Moderator by Moderator by Condition)

Main effect and two-way interaction analyses were followed by testing for possible three-way interactions between condition and two continuous moderator variables (effort, interest, attention, and need for cognition). To test possible interactions between condition and these variables, linear regression with interaction terms was again employed. Analyses were again run with and without controls. When employed, control variables (effort, interest, attention, need for cognition, and gender) were entered into the regression equation along with condition and the potential moderators variable at step 1. The condition by moderator variable (effort, interest, attention, or need for cognition) interaction terms, as well as the two-way interaction terms for the two moderator variables were entered as additional predictors at step 2. The three-way interaction terms between condition and the two moderator variables were entered at step 3. As before, "main effects" of condition and the moderator were tested at step 1, while condition by moderator effects were tested at step 2, and condition by moderator three-ways were tested at step 3.

Condition by Attention and Expertise Three-way Interaction

Only one three-way regression analysis yielded significant results: a two-way interaction of the accountability dummy-code and political expertise predicting tolerance, within the regression equation for a three-way interaction of condition, attention and political expertise. Condition, attention, and expertise were entered at step 1; two-way interaction terms (condition dummy codes by attention, by expertise, and expertise by attention) were entered at step 2. At step 3, the two three-way interaction terms were

added (accountability dummy code by attention by expertise, and distraction dummy code by attention by expertise).

Step 1 revealed no significant effect of condition predicting tolerance for the accountability (*B*= -.132, β= -.053, *SE*= .217 with controls; *B*= -.156, β= -.062, *SE*= .213 without controls) and distraction conditions (*B*= -.313, β= -.117, *SE*= .229 with controls; *B*= -.331, β= -.124, *SE*= .224 without controls, all *p*>.05, see Tables 22 and 23). Step 1 results did reveal a significant main effect of attention on tolerance without controls (*B*=-1.003, β= -.306, *SE*= .266, *t(*159)= -3.770, p<.001), but not with controls (*B*= -.297, β= -.091, *SE*= .402). The effect of attention in the regression without controls indicates that higher self-report of attention to politics predicted lower levels of political tolerance.

Analyses at step 2 revealed a significant two-way interaction between the accountability dummy code and political expertise predicting tolerance, without controls (*B*= 2.684, β= .209, *SE*= .1.177, *t*(154)= 2.280, *p*= .024 , see Tables 22 and 23), but was only marginally significant in the regression run with controls (*B*= 2.03, β= .158, *SE*= 1.19 *p*<.10). No other two-way interactions were significant in this model, nor were any three-way interactions of condition, attention, and expertise at step 3.

Simple slopes analyses revealed that participants high in political expertise were less tolerant in the accountability condition (*M*= 3.148 *SE*= .373) than in the control condition (*M*= 3.741 *SE*= .368; *B*= 2.624, β= .565, *SE*= 1.179, *p*<.05). Participants high in political expertise in the distraction condition (*M*= 3.906, *SE*= .311) did not differ significantly from participants high in political expertise in the control condition on political tolerance (*M*= 3.741, *SE*= .368; *B*= .024, β= .005, *SE*= 1.446, *p*= .978),

Participants high in expertise in the distraction condition were marginally more tolerant than participants high in expertise in the accountability condition (*B*= -2.600, β= -.525, *SE*= 1.376, *p*= .061).

Conversely, participants low in political expertise were more tolerant in the accountability condition (*M*= 3.810 *SE*= .385) than in the control condition (*M*= 3.092 *SE*= .355; *B*= 2.624, β= .553, *SE*= 1.179, *p*<.05). Participants in the control condition *(M*= 3.092 *SE*= .355) did not differ from low political expertise participants in the distraction condition (*M*= 3.269 *SE*= .317; *B*= -.024, β= -.005, *SE*= 1.446, see Table 24). Participants low in expertise in the accountability condition (*M*= 3.810 *SE*= .385) were marginally more tolerant than low expertise participants in the distraction condition (*M*= 3.269 *SE*= .317; *B*= -2.600, β= -.528, *SE*= 1.376, *p*= .061). These results again support the hypothesis that the accountability manipulation inspires "flexible deliberation" that has starkly different results in political experts and non-experts.

As predicted by hypothesis 5, accountability seems to inspire political experts to deliberate in a manner that decreases tolerance (perhaps by inspiring them to consider safety concerns, or other negative consequences of free speech, or alternatively by inspiring them to consider which response is more socially desirable or politically appropriate), while it inspires non-experts to deliberate in a manner that increases tolerance (perhaps by inspiring them to consider pro-free-speech, pro-democratic norms they do not normally ponder, or by leading them to report higher tolerance in an attempt at providing a social desirable response). These findings support hypothesis five, and

complement the above findings, where a similar pattern was observed for participants high and low in need for cognition.

At step 3, no significant three-way interactions were found between attention, expertise, and the accountability (*B*= -1.991, β= -.064, *SE*= 2.978) and distraction (*B*=-4.672, β= -.151, *SE*= 3.383) dummy codes predicting political tolerance (both $p>.05$).

CHAPTER FOUR

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Discussion

Replication of Past Findings on Tolerance

Preliminary analyses replicated many core findings that have dominated the political tolerance literature of the last few decades. Since the advent of a content-controlled political tolerance measures that separate tolerance judgments from the selection of "least liked" groups, political tolerances has been demonstrated to be essentially independent of ideological or partisan political leanings (Sullivan et al, 1981; Sullivan et al, 1993). The results of this study reflect this prevailing finding, as political ideology and political party identification were not significantly associated with participants' political tolerance, nor were they related to the continuous predictor variables that were associated with tolerance levels, such as need for cognition, attention to politics, interest in politics, and political expertise.

The results of this experiment also support Stouffer's (1955) longstanding finding that elite participants are more tolerant. While no participants in this sample were true political elites, in that none wield notable political power, the most "elitelike" participants were the most tolerant, as evidenced by the high positive correlations between political variables such as interest and expertise, with tolerance . A**s** numerous studies subsequent to Stouffer have illustrated, greater political knowledge and interest spell higher levels of

tolerance; this trend was replicated in the present study results (Gibson, 1987; Marcus et al, 1995). Furthermore, general cognitive differences that have previously been demonstrated to relate to political tolerance also emerged as relevant predictors as well: need for cognition was strongly positively related to political tolerance, which recalls past research stating that higher education and intelligence levels is associated with higher levels of tolerance (Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Sullivan et al, 1982; Sinderman, 1984).

The preliminary results of this study also support Sullivan et al's (1982) "least-liked' methodology for measuring political tolerance. The tolerance questionnaire items used in this study were closely based on the stems devised by Sullivan and colleagues, and the "least-liked" procedure of personalizing items using the political group most abhorrent to the individual participant was drawn directly from their body of research. The twenty items based on Sullivan et al's past research displayed massive item-total reliability and were related to measured political constructs in a theoretically coherent way that conformed both to past research and to the present hypotheses. These results provide further support for the reliability and validity of the least-liked tolerance measure.

Support for Hypotheses: Flexible Deliberation

The results of the present study support hypothesis five, which predicted that the accountability manipulation would inspire "flexible deliberation" of the sort that would push normally tolerant respondents into less tolerant views, and would move participants inclined to intolerance into higher-than-typical levels tolerance. Specifically, results of two-way and three-way analyses indicated that the effect of the accountability

manipulation on tolerance was moderated by either need for cognition or political expertise. The pattern of results that emerged for both moderators was a crossover interaction; while greater expertise or higher need for cognition was associated with higher tolerance (based on the high positive correlation of both with tolerance), higher scores on these variables predicted lower tolerance among participants in the accountability condition.

This pattern of results provides cursory evidence for the notion that tolerance is a relatively "knee-jerk", nearly automatic attitudinal response for most participants, and this appears to be true of participants who report both high and low tolerance. Note that it was the effect of the accountability manipulation that was moderated by participants' need for cognition or political expertise in these analyses, suggesting that the distraction and control conditions had an essentially similar influence on participants of high and low need for cognition and political expertise.

If high political tolerance were, for example, the result of a slow, cognitively effortful "sober second thought" as predicted by Stouffer (1955), the present study's results should show that the effect of the distraction manipulation is moderated by need for cognition or expertise, such that "elitelike" participants high in either of these variables would be unable to take a sober second thought when distracted, and would report lower than usual tolerance. Rather, the opposite pattern was found: "elitelike" participants, those high in need for cognition or political knowledge, apparently became less tolerant when they were held accountable for their responses and encouraged to think more.

The results support hypotheses five then, by a) demonstrating that the distraction and control conditions are more similar in their effect on tolerance than is the accountability condition; and by b) demonstrating that the accountability manipulation pushes participants high in political expertise and need for cognition away from their typically high levels of tolerance while pushing participants low on these constructs away from their typically low tolerance. Thus, the accountability manipulation appears to inspire enhanced "deliberation" on the tolerance items, but not deliberation of a uniform sort. Participants high and low on need for cognition and political expertise apparently are altering their tolerance responses in the accountability condition, and they are doing so in different ways, indicating that the "deliberation" inspired by the accountability instructions is flexible and malleable. There are several potential underlying mechanisms that can account for this pattern: social desirability, overcorrection, and flexible deliberation.

Social Desirability

Participants high in political expertise or need for cognition might have reported lower tolerance in the accountability while participants low in these variables reported greater tolerance because both groups were motivated by the instructions to provide socially desirable responses. In the accountability condition, participants were informed that they would have to share and explain their responses to the tolerance items with another research participant of unknown views. These instructions might have motivated participants not to ponder the tolerance questions more thoughtfully on their own merit, but rather may have inspired them to try to provide a "normal", appropriate response.

Participants high and low in expertise and NFC may harbor different impressions, then, of what the typical and socially desirable response to tolerance items might be, causing them to report diametrically opposing "socially desirable" answers. "Elitelike" participants, those who know a great deal about politics or who are attracted to thinking a great deal, might have realized that the average participant is not particularly tolerant, and may have decided to scale down their level of tolerance downward in order to appeal to the more typical person. Conversely, a less "elitelike" participant who knows little about politics or who doesn't like to think effortfully might decide to give more tolerant responses than they normally would give, in order to appeal to a hypothetical participant who is inclined toward greater tolerance. Thus, the accountability manipulation might cause participants of differing levels of knowledge and NFC to adjust their reported tolerance in opposing directions, both out of a desire to give a response their conversation partner might be apt to like.

Overcorrection

Similarly, the accountability manipulation might inspire participants to expend effort trying to report the "correct" response to the tolerance items. If this is the case, participants might attempt to adjust for their own preexisting biases- either in favor of or in opposition to tolerance- but might mistakenly overcorrect, resulting in lower-than-usual tolerance for "elites" and higher-than-usual tolerance for nonelites. This potential mechanism is distinct from an aforementioned social desirability effect in that it posits participants were motivated by a desire to give a factually 'correct' response rather than pander to the particular opinion of their future conversation partner.

Flexible Deliberation

Finally, the pattern of results observed may arise because the accountability manipulation encourages participants to consider factors they normally do not consider when forming their tolerance judgments. For example, "elitelike" participants may be predisposed to tolerance in the distraction and control conditions because they think of the tolerance items in terms of civil liberties rights and focus on the importance of upholding democratic values, while nonelite or less tolerant participants are more apt to consider issues of public safety, the importance of censorship, and the need to protect young people from dangerous views when they initially view the tolerance questionnaire items. The accountability manipulation may serve as a cue for participants to consider factors they do not consider normally- either due to increased effort, increased integrative complexity, or motivation to take into account factors that their conversation partner might find important.

As described in hypothesis five, "elitelike" participants in the accountability condition may decide to take into account decisional factors that they normally do not weigh when reading the tolerance items; they may incorporate safety concerns or think about the other negative consequences of free speech for abhorrent groups, causing their tolerance judgments to adjust downward from their more typical levels. Conversely, participants low in expertise or need for cognition may also interpret the accountability instructions as a cue to consider factors they normally ignore, and therefore may consider the importance of upholding democratic values, or the intrinsic value of free speech, and report higher-than-usual tolerance as a result.

While need for cognition and political expertise appeared to moderate the effect of the accountability condition in a manner consistent with hypothesis five, the present data cannot provide definitive insights into why this pattern emerged or what psychological process underlied it. If, for example, the accountability instructions increased the extent to which participants elaborated and deliberated effortfully on the tolerance items, an effect of condition on participants'' self-report of effort should have emerged. Since condition appeared to bear no influence on participants' effort in answering the tolerance questionnaire, it is impossible to rule out any of the three psychological mechanisms described above. The effect of the accountability manipulation on participants' political tolerance may have emerged because of participants' desire to give a socially desirable response, to provide a 'correct' response, or to think more effortfully and take into account factors they did not otherwise typically consider.

Future replications of this experiment should include multiple manipulation checks, including a detailed and open-ended measure of integrative complexity (see Tetlock, 1983). Future versions of this study should feature an a essay-format question asking participants to describe the factors they considered when crafting their responses to the tolerance items. This detailed response could then be coded for degree differentiation and integration of various arguments, and could be used to determine whether participants in the accountability condition actually thought more (or more effortfully) than participants in the other conditions. If there is no effect of accountability on participants' cognitive effort (as may be the case in the present results), this would

support the possibility that the moderation of condition by need for cognition or expertise results from a social desirability effects or overcorrection. Social desirability could be tested as an underlying mechanism in future studies by explicitly stating (and manipulating) the reported tolerance of the participant's conversation partner (see below for a more detailed description of future directions).

Distraction by Gender Interaction

An unhypothesized effect emerged in two-way analyses: the effect of the distraction condition on political tolerance appears to be moderated by participants' gender. Namely, women reported higher tolerance in the distraction condition than the control and accountability conditions, while men reported lower tolerance in the distraction condition than in the other two conditions. It is unclear why this pattern emerged. Historical research on political tolerance has suggested that women are slightly less tolerant than men (Stouffer, 1955), but the present study posits no a priori reason to expect that women would respond differently to the distraction manipulation than men.

One potential explanation for the observed moderation effect is that men and women were not 'distracted' equally by the distraction task. Due to either differences in ability or due to stereotype threat, women may have found the number-memorization task more daunting than men (see Spencer, Steel & Quinn, 1999). Threatened by the pervasive stereotype that women are worse with numbers than men, female participants may have expended more effort memorizing the number string and may have been more distracted from the tolerance questions, which may have caused them to consider the negative drawbacks of tolerance less and report a more tolerant view. Men might have been less

distracted and cognitively taxed by the number memorization task and may have had more available cognitive resources, allowing them to consider the potential consequences of tolerance, leading to diminished tolerance. The opposite, of course, could also be true- women might have slightly better memory performance at this task than men and might have reported greater tolerance because they had an opportunity to deliberate on the benefits of free speech, while men were more vexed by the task and less able to adjust for their prejudices against their least-liked group as a result, leading to diminished tolerance.

Alternatively, the interaction between gender and the distraction condition may have emerged because the psychological underpinnings of tolerance are different for male and female participants. Perhaps for women tolerance is a more immediate "knee-jerk" response that only gets dampened when there is an opportunity to consider negative consequences, whereas men become more tolerant when they have more time to process effortfully. If this is the case, the number-memorization task may have distracted male and female respondents equally, but with opposing results: distracted women may not have the chance to ponder the dangers of tolerance, and become more tolerant, whereas distracted men may be denied the opportunity to adjust for their prejudices for their least-liked political group, and become less tolerant. This explanation of the results, however, does hinge on the possibility that men and women are hardwired to think about civil liberties in different ways from the start, which is an explanation that itself demands an underlying mechanism and is therefore rather unparsimonious. Future studies should use an alternative distraction manipulation to see if the gender moderation effect remains (if

men and women are not equally distracted by the number-memorization effect, a more equitable distraction task should erase this moderation effect; see the future directions section below).

Study Limitations

Weak Manipulation of Accountability and Distraction

The present study features several limitations which should be corrected in future replications. The largest issue with the study is the apparent weakness of the accountability and distraction conditions on participants' responses. Recall that no main effect of condition on political tolerance emerged, nor did condition appear to have an effect of participants' effort in responding to questions. The accountability and distraction conditions may not have been successful for several reasons: the manipulations may have been too "weak", participants may not have taken the manipulations seriously, or participants may not have paid attention to the manipulations.

First, the accountability and distraction manipulations may not have been "strong" enough to garner their intended effects. While accountability to another hypothetical participant has been demonstrated to increase integrative complexity in previous research (e.g. Tetlock, 1984), it may not have influenced participants strongly enough in this experiment to lead to statistically significant effects on tolerance and self-reported effort. The same may be true of the distraction manipulation: participants may have been somewhat distracted by the number-memorizing task, but not a great deal, causing the manipulation to have no apparent significant effect on tolerance or effort. If

the accountability and distraction manipulations were successful but subtle, a larger sample size or stronger manipulation instructions could lead to observable effects.

However, the accountability and distraction manipulations may instead have been unsuccessful because participants did not believe or comply with the conditions' instructions. Participants in the accountability condition may not have believed that they would actually be paired with a conversation partner who would know their tolerance responses; this may be especially true of participants in single-person experimental sessions. Participants in the distraction condition may have decided not to expend much effort memorizing the number string, or may have willfully ignored the distraction conditions altogether. The use of a confederate "conversation partner" could resolve the former problem, whereas more strongly-worded instructions from the experimenter could resolve the latter.

Finally, the accountability and distraction manipulations may have failed because participants did not notice them. The study's respondents were drawn from a convenience sample of undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology course, and all participants were expected to participate in several different experiments in order to fulfill a course requirement. These participants may not have devoted a great deal of attention to the experimenter's instructions, or may have been motivated to complete the whole experiment as quickly as possible, which may have caused some respondents to miss or accidentally ignore the accountability or distraction instructions entirely. Again, a more strongly-worded set of condition instructions and a more emphatic experimenter

could potential resolve this issue and lead to a statistically significant effect on tolerance and effort.

Insensitive Manipulation Check

Another potential drawback of the present study is insensitivity of the manipulation check. As outlined above, there was no apparent effect of the accountability and distraction manipulations on participants' self-report of effort. This may have occurred because the manipulations were truly unsuccessful (as they apparently were on tolerance), or because the measure of effort was insensitive. As a self-report measure, the manipulation check may have fallen prey to social desirability effects. Participants may have been uniformly motivated to report that they expended a decent amount of effort answering the tolerance questions; this could have led to a "ceiling effect" whereby any increase in effort caused by the accountability manipulation was impossible to discover. Alternatively, participants may not have much awareness of their true level of effort expenditure, and therefore might be unable to report any effect the manipulations had on their responses. Future replications of this study should include a more detailed manipulation check, such as a measure of integrative complexity; in the future, participants' response-times should also be recorded, to determine whether the accountability or distraction conditions influence how quickly participants respond to the tolerance items.

Conclusion

Future Directions

Stronger Manipulations

Future replications of this study should feature stronger accountability and distraction manipulations, to determine whether there truly is a main effect of instruction and motivation participants' political tolerance. The accountability and distraction instructions should be more emphatically-worded and explained at greater length by the experimenter, to ensure that all participants hear and consider the instructions unique to their condition and abide by them. The accountability manipulation should also be made more believable in future versions of this study, with more strongly-worded instructions from the experimenter, and perhaps the inclusion of a confederate "conversation partner" to convince participants that they truly will be expected to explain their tolerance responses to another person.

Future replications could also vary whether or not participants in the accountability condition are made aware of their conversation partners' views, and could vary the comparative tolerance or intolerance of the partner, to help determine whether apparent effects of accountability on tolerance are driven by social desirability motivations. If the effect of accountability on tolerance is driven by participants'' motivation to provide a socially desirable response, they should alter their tolerance responses to mimic those of their conversation partner; however, if accountability instead influence the extent to which participants elaborate on the tolerance items (or the nature

of the information they consider), the explicit views of the conversation partner should have no effect.

The distraction manipulation should also be strengthened, both by bolstering the length and detail of the experimenter's instructions, and by making the distraction task more cognitively taxing. Again, more emphatically-worded instructions will help the researchers ensure that all participants in the distraction condition take part in the distraction task, which should increase the likelihood of discovering any main effects of distraction on tolerance where the exist. Furthermore, the number string should be lengthened or the distraction task should be replaced with an alternate, more challenging task; this will ensure that all participants in the distraction are truly "distracted" and unable to elaborate or think effortfully about the tolerance items. The distraction task should also perhaps be replaced with a lexical-decision-making task, or another tasking that will not potentially induce stereotype threat in female respondents. Replacing the distraction task with a less numerical activity would allow the researcher to determine the nature and origins of the distraction-by-gender interaction discovered in the present study.

Improved Manipulation Checks

Future variations on the present study should also feature more sensitive and detailed manipulation checks. As described above, there was no apparent effect of the accountability and distraction conditions on participants' perceived effort. This may have occurred because of a weakness in the experimental manipulation, or because the effort measures were insensitive to real variation in participants' effort levels. Future

manipulation checks should rely less on participant self-report. Participants' reaction-times should be recorded for the tolerance items, to determine whether or not participants in the accountability or distraction conditions answered the tolerance questions at different speeds from participants in the control condition. If the experimental manipulations do have an influence on participants' motivation or the extent to which they ponder the tolerance items, a quantifiable difference in their answering speeds should appear.

The present study could also be enhanced if participants' integrative complexity were assessed. Following the tolerance questionnaire, participants should be asked to write at length about what issues they considered while answering the previous questions. These detailed responses could then be coded for their levels of differentiation and integration of ideas, which could then be used to calculate participants' level of integrative complexity (Tetlock, 1983). This manipulation check would allow the experimenter to determine whether the accountability condition truly does motivate participants to think more effortfully about the tolerance items, and whether this inspires participants to ponder factors that do not normally enter into their tolerance judgments otherwise. If the experimental manipulations had no influence on participants' integrative complexity, the experimenter could rule out flexible deliberation as the underlying mechanism accounting for differences in tolerance across condition. Conversely, if condition-based effects on participants' integrative complexity were discovered, there would be initial support for the notion that the accountability and distraction

manipulations influence the nature of participants' "sober second thoughts", which in turn influences their tolerance.

APPENDIX A

TABLES

Table 1. Results of univariate ANOVA for condition predicting effort without controls.

Effects	Sums of squares	Df	Mean Square	F value	P value
Condition	4.329	2	2.164	1.341	.264
Error	261.474	162	1.614	-	-
Total	265.803	165	-	-	-

Table 2. Results of univariate ANOVA for condition predicting effort with controls.

Effects	Sums of squares	Df	Mean Square	F value	P value
Condition	.100	1	.100	.072	.789
Error	218.465	156	1.400	-	-
Total	262.100	164	-	-	-

Table 3. Results of pairwise contrasts of conditions predicting effort, without controls.

Contrast	Difference	Standard Error	P value
Distraction versus Control	.289	.250	.248
Accountability versus Distraction	.390	.244	.111
Accountability versus Control	.101	.236	.669

Table 4. Results of pairwise contrasts of conditions predicting effort, with controls.

Contrast	Difference	Standard Error	P value
Distraction versus Control	-.328	.236	.166
Accountability versus Distraction	.381	.231	.100
Accountability versus Control	.053	.224	.812

Table 5. Results of contrast of participants in accountability to participants in the distraction and control conditions (pooled) on effort.

Contrast	F value	η^2	P value
Accountability versus Distraction and Control, without controls	1.149	.007	.285
Accountability versus Distraction and Control with controls	1.338	.008	.249

Table 6. ANOVA for the effect of condition on predictor variables, without controls.

Effects	Sums of squares	Df	Mean Square	F value	P value
Condition on Expertise	.121	2	.061	1.658	.194
Error	5.894	161	.037	-	-
Total	6.015	164	-	-	-
Condition on Attention	.242	2	.121	.862	.424
Error	22.752	162	-	-	-
Total	22.994	165			
Condition on Interest	1.321	2	.661	1.386	.253
Error	77.199	162	.477	-	-
Total	78.520	165	-	-	-
Condition on Need for Cognition	.000	1	.000	.001	.974
Error	22.205	162	.137	-	-
Total	22.320	165	-	-	-

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level

* significant at the p<.05 level.

** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 7. ANOVA for the effect of condition on predictor variables, with controls.

Effects	Sums of squares	Df	Mean Square	F value	P value
Condition on Expertise	.026	1	.026	.887	.348
Error	4.585	157	.029	-	-
Total	6.015	164	-	-	-
Condition on Attention	.004	1	.004	.072	.788
Error	7.797	157	.050	-	-
Total	22.750	164	-	-	-
Condition on Interest	.018	1	.018	.114	.736
Error	24.324	157	.155	-	-
Total	78.359	164	-	-	-
Condition on Need for Cognition	.016	1	.016	.145	.704
Error	17.003	157	.108	-	-
Total	22.303	164	-	-	-

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level

* significant at the p<.05 level.

** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 8. Correlation matrix for all continuous variables analyzed.

	Tolerance	Effort	Expertise	Interest	Attention	Need for Cognition	Gender	Ideology	Party
Tolerance	1.00								
Effort	.147	1.00							
Expertise	.212**	.063	1.00						
Interest	.367**	.171	.441**	1.00					
Attention	-.344**	-.167*	-.410**	-.805**	1.00				
Need for Cognition	-.340**	-.374**	-.124	-.462**	.411	1.00			
Gender	-.166*	-.128	-.246**	-.252**	.243	.162*	1.00		
Ideology	.044	-.002	.105	.043	-.080	.042	-.093	1.00	
Party	.113	-.031	.013	-.010	-.089	.018	-.097	.780**	1.00

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level..

Table 9. Condition predicting tolerance analysis of variance.

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	η^2	p
Condition	2.235	2	1.117	.742	$.009_p$	.478
Error	243.969	162	1.506			

Table 10. Condition predicting tolerance analysis of covariance.

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	η^2	p
Condition	2.753	2	1.377	1.092	.014	.338
Gender	.556	1	.556	.441	.003	.508
Need for Cognition	9.434	1	9.434	7.486	.046	.007
Expertise	.760	1	.760	.603	.004	.439
Interest	1.605	1	1.605	1.274	.008	.261
Attention	.686	1	.686	.544	.003	.462
Error	196.612	156	1.260			

Table 11. Results of pairwise contrasts of conditions predicting political tolerance, without controls.

Contrast	Difference	Standard Error	P value
Distraction versus Control	-.268	.241	.268
Accountability versus Distraction	.043	.235	.855
Accountability versus Control	-.225	.228	.326

Table 12. Results of pairwise contrasts of conditions predicting political tolerance, without controls.

Contrast	Difference	Standard Error	P value
Distraction versus Control	.325	.226	.152
Accountability versus Distraction	.168	.221	.448
Accountability versus Control	-.157	.213	.463

Table 13. Mean political tolerance scores for participants in the accountability, distraction, and control conditions.

	Accountability	Distraction	Control	Omnibus F Value	P value
With controls	3.470	3.301	3.627	1.092	.338
No controls	3.420	3.378	3.645	.742	.478

Table 14. Condition and need for cognition predicting political tolerance.

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.416**	.119	-	3.425**	.120	-
Accountability (A)	-.156	.213	-.062	-.167	.212	-.066
Distraction (D)	-.331	.224	-.124	-.345	.224	-.129
Need for Cognition (N)	-.745**	.272	-.225	-.506	.327	-.153
Attention	-.297	.402	-.091	-.386	.405	-.118
Interest	.257	.228	.146	.199	.230	.113
Expertise	.407	.524	.064	.517	.527	.081
Gender	-.137	.206	-.050	-.167	.207	-.061
AxN	-	-	-	.972+	.582	.147
DxN	-	-	-	.454	.596	.069
R^2	.130			.139		
F Change in R^2	7.984**			.841		

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level

* significant at the p<.05 level.

** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 15. Condition and need for cognition predicting political tolerance without controls.

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.378**	.111	-	3.378**	.111	-
Accountability (A)	-.271	.215	-.107	-.281	.215	-.111
Distraction (D)	-.344	.227	-.129	-.358	.228	-.134

Need for Cognition (N)	-1.156**	.245	-.348	-.981**	.306	-.295
AxN	-	-	-	.754	.585	.114
DxN	-	-	-	.299	.609	.045
R^2		.130			.139	
F Change in R^2		7.984			.841	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level

* significant at the p<.05 level.

** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 16. Estimated mean tolerance scores for participants high and low in need for cognition in the accountability, control, and distraction conditions, with controls.

	Accountability	Control	Distraction
High Need for Cognition	3.013 (SE .202)*	3.172 (SE .212)*	3.231 (SE .191)
Low Need for Cognition	4.004 (SE .204)**	3.678 (SE .192)**	3.964 (SE .193)

* and ** indicate marginally significant mean differences.

Table 17. Estimated mean tolerance scores for participants high and low in need for cognition in the accountability, control, and distraction conditions, without controls.

	Accountability	Control	Distraction
High Need for Cognition	2.839 (SE.191)	2.887 (SE.194)	2.991(SE.178)
Low Need for Cognition	4.197(SE.190)	3.868 (SE.184)	4.122 (SE.185)

* and ** indicate marginally significant mean differences.

Table 18. Condition and gender predicting political tolerance, with controls.

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.416**	.119	-	3.508**	.126	-
Accountability (A)	-.156	.213	-.062	-.040	.230	-.016
Distraction (D)	-.331	.224	-.124	-.079	.253	-.030
Gender (G)	-.137	.206	-.050	-.474+	.258	-.175
Attention	-.297	.402	-.091	-.260	.399	-.079
Interest	.257	.228	.146	.258	.226	.146
Expertise	.407	.524	.064	.547	.524	.086

Need for Cognition	-.745**	.272	-.225	-.690*	.271	-.209
AxG	-	-	-	-.592	.455	-.121
DxG	-	-	-	-1.080*	.505	-.220
R^2		.193			.217	
F Change in R^2		5.323			2.343	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level

* significant at the p<.05 level.

** significant at the p<.01 level

Table 19. Condition and gender predicting political tolerance, without controls.

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.507**	.128	-	3.608**	.134	-
Accountability (A)	-.204	.226	-.081	-.059	.244	-.023
Distraction (D)	-.223	.240	-.084	.042	.269	.016
Gender (G)	-.434*	.212	-.159	-.820**	.268	.016
AxG	-	-	-	-.787	.487	-.160
DxG	-	-	-	-1.186*	.538	-.214
R^2		.034			.066	
F Change in R^2		1.903			2.667	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level

* significant at the p<.05 level.

** significant at the p<.01 level

Table 20. Estimated means for female and male participants in the accountability, control, and distraction conditions, with controls.

	Accountability	Control	Distraction
Female	3.425 (SE .132)*	3.267 (SE .128)*	3.571 (SE .128)
Male	3.626 (SE .223)**	3.816 (SE .224)**	3.525 (SE .197)

* and ** indicate marginally significant mean differences

Table 21. Estimated means for female and male participants in the accountability, control, and distraction conditions, without controls.

	Accountability	Control	Distraction
Female	3.424 (SE .139)*	3.198 (SE .133)*	3.474 (SE .134)
Male	3.851 (SE .230)**	4.018 (SE.233)**	3.700 (SE .203)

* and ** indicate marginally significant mean differences

Table 22. Condition, attention, and expertise predicting political tolerance, without controls.

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.394**	.112	-	3.376**	.115	-
Accountability (A)	-.132	.217	-.053	-.095	.217	-.038
Distraction (D)	-.313	.229	-.117	-.329	.228	-.123
Attention (AT)	-.100**	.266	-.306	-.977**	.331	-.299
Expertise (E)	.516	.520	.081	.574	.689	.090
AxE	-	-	-	2.684*	1.117	.209
DxE	-	-	-	-.040	1.44	-.003
AxAT	-	-	-	.392	.637	.060
DxAT	-	-	-	.281	.702	.043
ExAT	-	-	-	-1.673	1.263	-.101
R^2	.361			.419		
F Change in R^2	5.950			1.686		

Variable	Model 3		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.339**	.119	-
Accountability (A)	-.170	.234	-.067
Distraction (D)	-.481+	.253	-.180
Attention (AT)	-.978**	.332	-.299
Expertise (E)	.467	.694	.073
AxE	2.593*	1.181	.202
DxE	-.345	1.461	-.027
AxAT	.534	.646	.081
DxAT	.418	.714	.064
ExAT	-2.933	1.570	-.178
AxATxE	-1.991	2.978	-.064
DxATxE	-4.672	3.838	-.151
R^2	.186		
F Change in R^2	.955		

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level

* significant at the p<.05 level.

** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 23. Condition, attention, and expertise predicting political tolerance, with controls.

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.416**	.119	-	3.384**	.128	-
Accountability (A)	-.156	.213	-.062	-.126	.215	-.050
Distraction (D)	-.331	.224	-.124	-.342	.225	-.128
Attention (AT)	-.297	.402	-.091	-.393	.439	-.120
Expertise (E)	.407	.524	.064	.427	.688	.067
Need for Cognition	-.745**	.272	-.225	-.703	.276*	-.213
Interest	.257	.228	.146	.177	.232	.101
Gender	-.137	.206	-.050	-.093	.214	-.034
AxE	-	-	-	2.03+	1.19	.158
DxE	-	-	-	-.209	1.437	-.013
AxAT	-	-	-	.372	.642	.057
DxAT	-	-	-	.273	.703	.042
ExAT	-	-	-	-1.574	1.272	-.095
R^2	.193			.222		
F Change in R^2	5.323			1.149		

Variable	Model 3		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.353**	.130	-
Accountability (A)	-.189	.230	-.075
Distraction (D)	-.486+	.249	-.182
Attention (AT)	-.347	.440	-.106
Expertise (E)	.294	.696	.046
Need for Cognition	-.661*	.279	-.200
Interest	.224	.237	.127
Gender	-.107	.215	-.039
AxE	1.939	1.139	.151
DxE	-.503	1.453	-.040
AxAT	.494	.649	.075
DxAT	.387	.711	.059
ExAT	-2.774+	1.569	-.168
AxATxE	-1.801	2.980	-.058
DxATxE	-4.577	3.373	-.148
R^2	.232		

F Change in R^2	.930

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level

* significant at the p<.05 level.

** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 24. Estimated means for participants high and low in political expertise in the accountability, control, and distraction conditions, without controls.

	Accountability	Control	Distraction
High Political Expertise	3.148 (SE .373)*+	3.741 (SE .368)*	3.906 (SE .311)+
Low Political Expertise	3.810 (SE .385)**++	3.092 (SE .355)**	3.269 (SE .317)++

+, ++, *, and ** indicate significant mean differences

Table 25. Estimated means for participants high and low in political expertise in the accountability, control, and distraction conditions, with controls.

	Accountability	Control	Distraction
High Political Expertise	3.257 (SE .370)	3.683 (SE.369)	3.879 (SE .310)
Low Political Expertise	3.771 (SE.390)	3.192 (SE.360)	3.343 (SE .330)

+, ++, *, and ** indicate significant mean differences

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VITA

Erika Price spent the first eighteen years of her life in Cleveland, Ohio. She attended The Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio, from 2006 to 2009, attaining a Bachelors of Arts' degree in Psychology and Political Science. She then continued her education by enrolling in Loyola University Chicago's Applied Social Psychology PhD program.

At Loyola, Erika studied social psychology, statistics, and research methodology. She worked on research projects in several Loyola faculty psychology labs, overseeing experiments on political candidate evaluation, stereotype threat, social cognition, persuasion, and romantic relationship functioning. She also worked as a teaching assistant in several undergraduate courses in research methods and social psychology.

Erika's present research interests include civil liberties attitudes and program evaluation.